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• Despite numerous successes, inﬂation
targeting (IT) has some notable
shortcomings. In particular, it does not
define the future path of the price level,
which may result in costly uncertainty
for the economy.
• Price-level targeting (PLT) reduces
future price-level uncertainty, but it is
not clear whether this comes at the
expense of increased macroeconomic
instability, including that caused by
large and persistent shocks to Canada’s
terms of trade.
• Research suggests that, compared with
IT, PLT delivers a reduction in consumer
price inﬂation and nominal interest rate
variability at the expense of slightly
higher output-gap variability.
• These results are highly sensitive to the
interaction between the relative
incidence of different macroeconomic
shocks and the extent to which price
setting is forward looking.
n November 2006, the Government and the
Bank of Canada announced the renewal of
Canada’s inﬂation-control agreement (Bank of
Canada 2006). Under the terms of this ﬁve-year
agreement, the Bank of Canada is committed to main-
taining the year-over-year change in the consumer
price index at the 2 per cent midpoint of a 1 to 3 per
cent target range. This is the fourth consecutive inﬂa-
tion-control agreement since the announcement of the
inflation-reductiontargetsin1991.Atthattime,Canada
followed New Zealand to become the second country
in the world to introduce inﬂation targets; since then,
more than 21 countries have followed suit. The Cana-
dian and international experience with inﬂation tar-
geting (IT) suggests that the policy has been a major
success. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant testament to this
is that, despite numerous challenging macroeconomic
developments, no country has abandoned the
arrangement (Svensson 2008).
Despite significant achievements—lower average infla-
tion rates, less inflation variability, more firmly anchored
inﬂation expectations, and less variability in output
relative to capacity—IT has notable shortcomings. In
particular, IT does not require a credible commitment
to long-run stability in the price level. In practical
terms, shocks to the price level under IT are simply
accommodated and thus not reversed. As shown in
Chart 1, when an economy is facing random shocks,
uncertainty about the future price level rises without
limit as the planning horizon increases, even though
uncertainty around the inflation rate is capped at
its unconditional variance. Price-level uncertainty is
particularly problematic for risk-averse economic
agents who enter into imperfectly indexed, long-term
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nominal contracts (e.g., mortgages).1 Although the
quantitative significance of price-level uncertainty
remains an open question, it is considered, conceptu-
ally at least, a weakness of inﬂation targeting.2
An alternative monetary policy strategy that directly
addresses the issue of price-level uncertainty is price-
level targeting (PLT). PLT differs from IT in that the
central bank makes an explicit commitment to meet a
publicly announced numerical target for the price
level rather than an inflation target. Intuitively, the
difference between IT and PLT is that, under inﬂation
targets, shocks to the price level are accommodated,
while under price-level targets shocks to the price
level are reversed. The difference between the behav-
iour of PLT and IT for a positive shock to prices is
shown in Chart 2. By focusing on the price-level target,
central banks can reduce the uncertainty associated
with the future level of prices.
The price-level target could be speciﬁed as a constant
or it could be allowed to grow at some predetermined
rate, e.g., 2 per cent, as in Chart 2. It has been argued
that allowing the price-level target to grow reduces
both the likelihood of hitting the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates (see Lavoie and Murchison,
1.  It is important to note as well that the impact of price-level uncertainty is
regressive. Low-income individuals cannot easily hedge this uncertainty.
2.  In an alternative strand of the literature it is argued that, in the face of pro-
ductivity shocks, an unvarying and hence “certain” price level is detrimental
to economic agents who enter into nominal contracts (Selgin 1997).
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this issue) and of encountering the potentially desta-
bilizing effects of deflation when compared with a
constant target.
Critics of PLT have traditionally
argued that it would lead to increased
macroeconomic variability in both
inﬂation and output.
In recent years, several important papers have com-
pared the relative merits of IT and PLT; summaries of
the literature can be found in Ambler (2007) and Côté
(2007). Brieﬂy, critics of PLT have traditionally argued
that it would lead to increased macroeconomic varia-
bility in both inﬂation and output, since returning the
price level to its target necessitates greater variability
in the inﬂation rate than does simply returning inﬂa-
tion to target. Greater inﬂation variability combined
with the presence of nominal rigidities in the economy
implies that there must also be greater variability in
the real side of the economy. Others have responded
that, under certain conditions, PLT could in fact deliver
more macro stabilization than does IT (Woodford
1999). This view relies heavily on the assumption that
expectations of future inﬂation are forward looking
and take into account, among other factors, the state-
Chart 2
Inﬂation Targeting vs. Price-Level Targeting
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ments and actions of a highly credible central bank.
Under PLT, inﬂation expectations act as a powerful
stabilizer, limiting the response of price- and wage-
setters to shocks that have consequences for inﬂation.
This article provides a relatively non-technical summary
of a recent Bank of Canada paper that compares the
relative ability of PLT and IT to stabilize the macro
economy when confronted by shocks similar to those
seen in recent history.3 The first part of the article
explains the methodology, while the second section
focuses on overall results, followed by a discussion of
a number of sensitivity analyses. The third section
pays special attention to the role played in the analysis
by shocks to Canada’s terms of trade. Our interest in
terms-of-trade shocks comes about because, under
PLT, persistent movements in the terms of trade could
require significant declines in other relative prices
in order to bring the average price level to target. In
the presence of nominal rigidities, this could induce
increased output variability. This argument is accentu-
ated by the difference in price rigidities, which are
greater in the non-traded goods sector of the economy
than in the traded goods sector. The article concludes
by highlighting future research.
Methodology
Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (henceforth CLM 2008a, b)
study the relative ability of PLT and IT to stabilize the
macroeconomy in a state-of-the-art, multi-country,
dynamic general-equilibrium model. CLM use a
stripped-down version of the International Monetary
Fund’s Global Economy Model (GEM) (Pesenti 2008).
The version of GEM used by CLM features two coun-
tries—Canada and the United States—and two sectors,
tradable and non-tradable goods. Non-tradable goods
are assumed to cover all services except ﬁnancial serv-
ices. All other goods are assumed to be tradable goods.
A key assumption of the study is that several differen-
tiated tradable (and non-tradable) goods are being
produced in each country.4 Product differentiation
gives firms some market power, which allows them
to set a price that is above their marginal cost of pro-
duction. Product differentiation also allows for the
3.  This summary is based in part on Coletti, Lalonde, and Muir (2008a),
which is forthcoming in a special issue of IMF Staff Papers on the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Model (GEM) and its applications
(2008). For a more complete technical description, see Coletti, Lalonde, and
Muir (2008b).
4.  Similarly, it is also assumed that workers offer differentiated skills to the
labour market, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). For a more thor-
ough non-technical description of the model, see CLM (2008b).
possibility that the basket of goods produced in
Canada for export to the United States will be different
from those produced by U.S. firms for export to Canada,
leading to a meaningful distinction between the terms
of trade and the real exchange rate.5 Other important
features of the model include nominal rigidities in
the form of both wage and price rigidity. The model
also allows for a form of indexing of inflationtopast
inﬂation, which can be thought of as reﬂecting the
existence of rule-of-thumb price-setters who base their
expectations of future inﬂation on last period’s inﬂa-
tion outcomes. Real rigidities, including habit-forma-
tion in consumption and leisure and adjustment
costs in investment, help to generate the observed per-
sistence in movements in the real economy.
The study compares the ability of simple IT and PLT
rules to stabilize the macroeconomy under the
assumption that the two-country model would be hit
by shocks similar in size to those seen in Canada and
the United States over the 1983–2004 period.6  The
authors assume that the central bank cares principally
about stabilizing the variability of output relative to
production capacity and the variability of consumer
price inﬂation.7 More formally, the central bank seeks
to minimize the following quadratic loss function:
, (1)
where , , and are the unconditional var-
iances of the gap between consumer price inﬂation
( ) and the target inﬂation rate ( ), the output gap
(ygap), and the change in the policy interest rate ( ).8
The quadratic functional form is consistent with the
notion that central banks view large deviations from
the targets as disproportionately more costly than
small variations. The weights on the various elements
inthefunctionimplythatthecentralbankcaresequally
5.  One notable shortcoming of the model is that it does not explicitly
incorporate a commodities sector. Commodities are particularly important
for understanding the evolution of Canada’s terms of trade. This is an area
for future work.
6.  Although all shocks are considered to be temporary, they can be quite
persistent (e.g., productivity shocks). Speciﬁc details on the shocks can be
found in CLM (2008a, b).
7. An alternative approach to evaluating the merits of different monetary pol-
icy frameworks is to choose rules that maximize the welfare of the model’s
representative consumer. An important advantage of this approach is that it
allows us to analyze which variables should be stabilized by monetary policy.
On the downside, it also means that the welfare function will be model
speciﬁc.
8. The output gap is the difference between the economy’s actual output and
the level of output that it can achieve with existing capital, the level of total
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Results
Based on a set of macroeconomic shocks similar to
those seen over the 1983– 2004 period, CLM show that
PLT generates slightly greater macroeconomic stabil-
ity than IT in terms of minimizing the weighted aver-
age of consumer price inﬂation, the output gap, and
nominal interest rate variability in Canada (Table 1). To
be more precise, PLT delivers a reduction in the varia-
bility in consumer price inﬂation and nominal interest
rates at the expense of slightly higher variability in the
output gap.
PLT delivers a reduction in the
variability in consumer price
inﬂation and nominal interest rates
at the expense of slightly higher
variability in the output gap.
From Table 1, we can also see that the quantitative dif-
ference between the two monetary policy frameworks
is quite small (0.5 per cent) when measured relative to
the gain in moving from an historical Taylor (1993)
rule to the optimized IT rule.12 It is important to
remember, however, that the preferred IT rule puts a
very high weight on interest-rate smoothing (Table 2).
All else being equal, as this weight approaches 1, the
inﬂation-targeting central bank acts increasingly like a
price-level targeter. A weight of 1 on the lagged inter-
12.  See CLM (2008b) for further details on the Taylor rules used to calibrate




targeting (IT) targeting (PLT)
Loss function* 2.15 2.13
Incremental beneﬁt** – 0.5%
Standard deviations of key variables under the optimized rules
Consumer price inﬂation 0.50 0.41
Output gap 1.34 1.37
Interest rate (change) 1.09 1.02
* Because of rounding, the results for the aggregate loss function may not
correspond to the sum of its parts.
** Incremental beneﬁt of moving from the optimized IT simple rule to the
optimized PLT simple rule relative to the gain from moving from the histor-
ical Taylor rule to the optimized IT simple rule.
about inﬂation and the output gap. The small weight
on the change in the policy rate eliminates rules that
cause the nominal interest rate to hit the zero lower
bound more than ﬁve per cent of the time.9
We assume that the central bank commits to setting
thecontemporaneouspolicyinterestrate,R,according
to the simple rule:
(2)
,
where reﬂects the sum of the average real short-
term interest rate and the trend inflation rate, p denotes
the logarithmic level of consumer prices, and
denotes expectations made in period t.10  For IT,
while for PLT, .The central bank chooses the
weight on interest-rate smoothing ( ), the degree to
which it reacts to expected deviations of consumer
price inﬂation (or the price level) from target ( ), the
degree to which it reacts to the output gap ( ), and
the degree to which policy is forward looking (k) to
minimize the objective function given in (1).
The model’s parameters were chosen to allow it to
closely replicate some of the key features of the
Canadian and U.S. economies.11 Of particular signiﬁ-
cance is the model’s ability to replicate the persistence
of consumer price and wage inﬂation over the sample
period. The calibration is notionally consistent with
assuming that about 40 per cent of firms and consumer-
workers (rule-of-thumb agents) form inﬂation expec-
tations based exclusively on last period’s inflation rate.
The remaining 60 per cent (forward-looking agents)
are assumed to form their inﬂation expectations in a
more forward-looking manner by taking into account
all of the available information, including the structure
of the economy, the realization of shocks, and the
behaviour of the central bank.
9.  This calculation is based on the assumption that the average real interest
rate equals 3 per cent and the trend inﬂation rate equals 2 per cent.
10.  Our analysis is restricted to consumer prices in the monetary reaction
function. It may be preferable to target an alternative price index (e.g., non-
tradable goods prices), particularly in the case of PLT. Examining which index
is best to target is the subject of ongoing research.
11.  Real data are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter with a stiff-
ness parameter of 10,000. All Canadian nominal variables are detrended
using the inﬂation target after 1991 and the implied inﬂation target calculated
from the Bank of Canada’s staff economic projection over the 1983–90 period
(Amano and Murchison 2005). All U.S. nominal variables are detrended using
an estimate of the implied inﬂation target in the United States (Lalonde 2005).
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est rate would imply that nominal interest rates would
continue to rise as long as inﬂation remained above
target, resulting in a reversal of the initial shock to the
price level. It is also interesting to note that the amount
of interest rate smoothing suggested by the model is
much greater than that typically found in empirical
estimates of simple IT rules.13
To better understand the robustness of these results,
CLM conduct two main sensitivity analyses. The ﬁrst
confirms findings in the existing literature that the
relative ability of PLT versus IT to stabilize the macro-
economy depends on the degree to which prices are
determined in a forward-looking manner. The more
forward-looking price-setting becomes, the easier it is
for the central bank to make a credible commitment to
use PLT to reduce inﬂation variability without induc-
ing excessive cycling in the real economy. We calculate
that if the proportion of rule-of-thumb price- and
wage-setters were increased from 40 per cent to 50 per
cent, IT would be preferred to PLT. Based on more
recent data, however, it is more reasonable to assume
that a lower proportion of agents would form inﬂation
expectations based on lagged inflation. In fact, focusing
on the very low level of persistence in price and wage
inﬂation over the inﬂation-targeting period in Canada
would lead us to conclude that the proportion of rule-
of-thumb price- and wage-setters was likely closer
to zero than to 40 per cent. Even more convincing
evidence from Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) shows
that, over the 1994–2003 period, private sector inflation
expectations in Canada (and other inﬂation-targeting
countries) have been decoupled from lagged inﬂation.
In addition, the proportion of nominal wage contracts
in Canada with a cost-of-living adjustment to past
inﬂation has declined to about 10 per cent in recent
years, from about 25 per cent in the 1980s (Fay and
Lavoie 2002).14 Such a reduction in the proportion
13.  The reasons for this are interesting in their own right, but are beyond the
scope of this article.
14.  In addition, Amano, Ambler, and Ireland (2008) show that the degree of
indexation of nominal wage contracts to lagged inﬂation would be lower
under PLT than under IT.
Table 2
The Optimized Simple Policy Rules
Inﬂation Price-level





of rule-of-thumb price- and wage-setters would
strengthen the case for PLT.
The relative performance of the alternative monetary
policy frameworks is also found to depend on an
important interaction between the proportion of rule-
of-thumb price- and wage-setters and the relative
incidence of shocks. Specifically, as long as there is a
signiﬁcant proportion of rule-of-thumb price- and
wage-setters, the relative importance of the different
shocks to the economy matters for the overall results.
In the base-case calibration, PLT is preferred to IT in
the case of shocks to the economy that cause consumer
price inﬂation and the output gap to move in the same
direction, such as domestic demand shocks and all
foreign shocks (type A shocks).15 On the other hand,
IT generates more macroeconomic stability than PLT
for shocks that cause inverse movements in inﬂation
and the output gap, such as domestic price/wage
shocks (type B shocks).16
Although the cumulative output gap
is larger under PLT, the PLT output
gap has a smaller variance than that
under IT.
The intuition for this result comes from considering
type A and type B shocks under the assumption that
there are no rule-of-thumb price- and wage-setters.
First, consider a positive shock to domestic prices (a
type B shock) under PLT (see Chart 3). The central
bank’s commitment to a target path for the price level
implies that future inﬂation rates must be lower under
PLT than under IT. As a result, the initial rise in
inflation is lower than that under IT. The reduction in
inﬂation volatility is not merely the result of the cen-
tral bank’s announcement of a target path for the price
level. To generate the reduction in inﬂation volatility,
the central bank creates relatively more cumulative
15.  For example, a positive U.S. demand shock leads to higher Canadian
exports, a positive Canadian output gap, higher Canadian import prices, and
a rise in Canadian inﬂation. Alternatively, a negative U.S. price (or positive
U.S. productivity) shock in the non-tradable goods sector leads to a rise in the
demand for labour in the United States, a higher wage, and a rise in the price
of  traded goods produced in the United States. In turn, a rise in U.S. traded-
goods prices leads to both an increase in Canadian import prices and positive
excess demand in Canada, owing to a rise in exports to the United States.
16.  More formally, price and wage shocks are shocks to the degree of compe-
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excess supply under PLT than under IT. In fact, as
long as the price level is above the target, PLT requires
excess supply. Under PLT, all else being equal, the cen-
tralbank will ﬁnd it optimal to create less initial excess
supply that lasts longer relative to IT. Taken together,
this means that although the cumulative output gap
is larger under PLT, the PLT output gap has a smaller
variance than that under IT.17
Now consider a positive demand shock (a type A
shock). Once again, the initial rise in inﬂation under
PLT is smaller than under IT as a result of the central
bank’s commitment to a target path for the price level
(Chart 4). The commitment to PLT also means that the
central bank must create excess supply at some time in
the future under PLT, but not under IT. In addition,
the initial jump in the output gap under PLT is also
smaller than it is under IT. Consequently, both the
cumulative output gap and the variance of the output
gap under PLT are smaller than they are under IT.
In the absence of rule-of-thumb price- and wage-
setting, the relative beneﬁts of PLT versus IT are larger
for type A shocks than for type B shocks. As the pro-
portion of rule-of-thumb price- and wage-setters rises,
the central bank has an increasingly difficult time
reducing inﬂation variability without incurring a rela-
tively large increase in output-gap variability. When
theproportionofrule-of-thumbprice-andwage-setters
reaches about 40 per cent, as in CLM, PLT delivers
better results for both output and inﬂation variability
in type A shocks, but IT is preferred in type B shocks.
As a result, the overall assessment of the relative

















ability of PLT and IT to stabilize the macroeconomy
depends, among other factors, on the relative incidence
of type A and type B shocks.
Terms-of-Trade Shocks
We now turn our attention from the aggregate results
to the speciﬁc issue of large and persistent shocks to
the terms of trade. A nation’s terms of trade are the
price of its exports relative to the price of its imports.
The evolution of Canada’s terms of trade since 1961 is
shown in Chart 5.  Since Canada is a relatively small
country on the global stage, the prices of both its
imports and exports are heavily (but not exclusively)
determined by developments outside of Canada.
Historically, Canada’s terms of trade have been most
inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in the world price of its key
(net) exports, energy and non-energy commodities,18
as well as movements in the world price of its key (net)
imports, computers and peripheral equipment (Amano,
Coletti, and Murchison 2000). More recently, falling
prices of imported consumer goods from emerging
economies have also boosted Canada’s terms of trade
(Duguay 2006; Macdonald 2007).19
18.   Commodity production represents about 11 per cent of Canadian gross
domestic product (GDP), and commodity exports account for 45 per cent of
the dollar value of our total exports (Duguay 2006).
19.   In some cases, however, the source of the terms-of-trade shock could
emanate from Canada itself. For example, there are some sectors in which
developments in Canada are able to inﬂuence international prices because of
the large market share enjoyed by Canadian producers (e.g., North American
natural gas prices). Alternatively, Canadian producers can also face a down-
ward-sloping demand curve in international markets because they produce a
relatively differentiated product (e.g., certain automobile models, telecommu-
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Improvements in Canada’s terms of trade are gener-
ally thought to have an important positive inﬂuence
on the economy.20 All else being equal, higher terms
of trade means that the price of the goods Canadians
sell to foreigners has gone up relative to the price
Canadians pay to foreigners for their goods. On balance,
Canadians receive a net transfer of wealth from our
tradingpartners,whichhastwoimportantimplications
for the behaviour of Canadians. First, it means that
our real purchasing power has increased, thereby
allowing a higher level of consumption. Second, it
also means that Canadians will tend to consume rela-
tivelymoreimportsthandomesticallyproducedgoods.
An improvement in the terms of trade also affects the
relative level of activity in different sectors of the
economy as labour and capital move into the sectors
where the returns are higher.
Our special interest in terms-of-trade shocks stems
from their importance for the Canadian economy and
the fact that monetary policy under PLT and IT would
respond differently to these shocks. Under IT, the cen-
tral bank would largely ignore the initial change in the
aggregate consumer price level caused by the change
in the terms of trade and instead focus on returning
aggregate inﬂation to its target. This response might
involve a relatively modest change in policy interest
rates with implications for the aggregate output gap
and for production levels in both the tradable and
non-tradable goods sectors.
20.   A notable exception would be a terms-of-trade improvement resulting
from a negative supply shock in a sector in which Canada enjoys important
market power.
Chart 5
Terms of Trade for Canada
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In contrast, under PLT, movements in the terms of
trade could require signiﬁcant changes in other rela-
tive prices in order to return the average consumer
price level to target. The added inflation volatility
could induce increased output variability, especially
since price rigidities in the non-traded goods sector
are greater than those in the traded goods sector.
Under PLT, movements in the terms
of trade could require signiﬁcant
changes in other relative prices in
order to return the average consumer
price level to target.
Recall, however, that there are offsetting forces at play
under PLT. As discussed earlier, a credible commit-
ment to PLT can serve to reduce the variability of
inﬂation relative to IT. The quantitative importance of
this channel depends negatively on the proportion of
rule-of-thumb price- and wage-setters and positively
on the proportion of type A shocks.
It therefore becomes important to identify the sources
of terms-of-trade shocks in order to quantify the rela-
tive strengths of the competing forces under PLT. An
historical analysis with the stripped-down, two-country
version of the GEM suggests that most of the variability
in Canada’s terms of trade is caused by foreign shocks,
which generate a positive correlation between the out-
put gap and consumer price inﬂation in Canada. In
particular, the main shocks are: i) U.S. consumption
shocks, ii) U.S. import shocks, and iii) exchange rate
shocks.21 Consequently, the authors find that the
stabilizing effect of a credible commitment to PLT
dominates the other forces at play. As a result, they
conclude that PLT delivers better macroeconomic
stability than does IT for shocks to Canada’s terms of
trade.
Conclusions and Future Work
The Bank of Canada research by Coletti, Lalonde, and
Muir reviewed in this article suggests that macroeco-
21.   This result may be sensitive to the speciﬁcation and calibration of the
model as well as to the historical time period under consideration. For
example, the 1983–2004 period studied here largely ignores the large rise in
Canada’s terms of trade over the 2003–07 period that was driven by strong
demand for commodities from emerging Asia, as well as the two major
supply-driven world-oil-price shocks of the early 1970s and early 1980s. The
implications of these events for the relative merits of IT and PLT are currently
being studied.42 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2007–2008
nomic stability under PLT would be slightly better than
under IT. In addition, when the analysis is restricted to
the basket of shocks that have been identiﬁed as the
most influential for the determination of Canada’s
terms of trade over the 1983–2004 period, PLT is found
to deliver slightly better macroeconomic stability. An
important result is that the relative ability of PLT and
IT to stabilize the macroeconomy is quite sensitive to
the fraction of rule-of-thumb wage- and price-setters
intheeconomyandtherelativeincidenceofthedifferent
types of shocks that can hit the economy.
Because of several important uncertainties in the anal-
ysis, the results of this research should be interpreted
as merely indicative. In particular, the structure and
calibration of the model are imperfect approximations
of the actual economy. In addition, the relative inci-
dence of future shocks could be very different than
that seen over the 1983–2004 sample.
Considerable research is being done at the Bank of
Canada to improve our understanding of the relative
merits and costs of price-level targeting. This work
includes extensions of the analysis reported here that
focus on the special role that terms-of-trade shocks
could play. Specifically, research is currently being
done to study the impact of: i) including a formal
commodity-producing sector in the analysis,22
ii) examining whether the results are sensitive to
allowing for permanent shocks to the terms of trade,
and iii) reconsidering which index would be best to
target under PLT.  Lastly, since large and persistent
movements in the terms of trade generate signiﬁcant
shifts in production and employment across different
sectors and geographical regions in the economy,
there is considerable interest in better understanding
the implications of the relative merits of PLT and IT in
incorporating the costs of reallocating capital and
labour across sectors.
22. This analysis is being conducted with the Bank of Canada’s version of the
GEM, BoC-GEM (Lalonde and Muir 2007). BoC-GEM differs signiﬁcantly
from the stripped-down version of GEM used in CLM. Most notably, BoC-
GEM incorporates ﬁve regions as well as energy and non-energy commodi-
ties sectors.
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